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In the wireless communications, the signal is susceptible to be
intercepted by eavesdroppers. As the security concerns the
link reliability, the purpose of this project is to secure the data
information in the physical layer. The idea is to apply a sin-
gular value decomposition (SVD) scheme in a multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) system between the access point and
the target user.
The interest of our project is how the eavesdropper will
catch the signal. The system has to be robust built-in and
should be totally transparent and inherent for the user. This
project mainly includes three aspects.
• Evaluate the performance of the SVD scheme in a MIMO
narrowband system. In this part we try to enhance the
target user capacity by changing the power allocation
schemes (Uniform, Water filling).
• Investigate the security robustness of our system regard-
ing the eavesdropper interceptions. In this section, we
evaluate the performance of the eavesdropper by apply-
ing different processing such as SVD, combining tech-
niques (Equal Gain Combing (EGC), Maximun Ration
Combining (MRC)).
• Propose a trade-off between the capacity of the target user
and the signal deterioration to prevent the eavesdropper
to capture and understand the data information.
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Preface
This report is the result of the 10th semester project which has been worked from the 1st
February to the 7th of june 2007 by the students of Mobile communications group 07gr1122
at the APNet department of Electronic Systems, Aalborg University, Denmark. This report
is an investigation on the way to secure wireless communications by acting on the physi-
cal layer using a SVD scheme. The project has been achieved on the "space space" domain
in narrowband, and is based on the SVD transmission method. This report includes the
problem delimitation, and the understanding of the different techniques that we are using
in the project.
Once the technical review has been introduced, we defined different scenarios to work
on, and we presented the simulation model that we used "Double scattering model". Fi-
nally, using a software simulator called "MATLAB", we simulated the defined scenarios
in the "double scattering model" to know more about the security robustness of the SVD
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Nowadays wireless communications is one of the most active areas of technology devel-
opment. This development is being driven primarily by the demand for new wireless
capacity such as voice telephony, video transmission, images, text and data.
However a very important feature of wireless transmissions is the security aspect. In-
deed, counter to wired communications which are very secured in each layer of the OSI
model, the security is a major weakness for wireless technologies. In wireless communica-
tions, the physical layer has an active role in the frailness of the security.
Thus, the goal of our project is to secure the data information in the physical layer by




Wireless network is widely used and popular communication tool, used to exchange mes-
sages and documents (including private and personal information, on line commercial
transaction, etc). It is also the most exposed network to be attacked. That’s why the secu-
rity issue of a wireless network is very important. Transmission security covers the con-
fidentiality, integrity and authentication of a transmitted information [1]. A confidential
transmission can only be received by the person it is addressed to. Its integrity is assured if
no unauthorized person can modify its content without being discovered. Authentication
allows verifying the identity of the transmitter.
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If we take the example of an electronic message, the first step is to enable users of this
very open and therefore potentially vulnerable service to perform transactional operations
with the following characteristics:
1. Authentication
The goal of authentication is to reliably learn the name of the originator of a message.
2. Integrity
The goal of integrity is to be sure that the received digital contents will not be modi-
fied while the information is sent.
3. Confidentiality
The goal of confidentiality is that only the addressee can "open" the electronic mes-
sage.
In a wireless network, the transmission between two nodes must be highly secure to
prevent any kind of interception made by the eavesdroppers.
Figure 1.1: Eavesdropper scheme
To prevent any kind of interception, we choose to use the confidentiality characteristic
to fight against eavesdroppers. Thus, our project will be based on the way to code the
information in order to protect the confidentiality characteristic of the transmitted mes-
sage. Code phase information, code time information or code frequency information are
different codes that we can use to protect information. In the next chapter, we are going to
present all of these codes to finally use one of them.
2
OSI model [2]
Regarding the OSI model, the security issue has been commonly investigated in high lay-
ers, such as Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) in the network layer and Transport Layer
Security (TLS) in the transport layer. A few protocols have been developed to achieve se-
curity in wireless communications in the datalink layer, such as Wired Equivalent Privacy
(WEP) which finally seems to be too weak. WEP provides the same encryption key for
every user on a network, and this key is only 40 bits. The worst drawback of the WEP, is
a mathematical program called "Airsnort", available from many websites, which allows a
hacker to eliminate most possible keys in the key management system built into WEP [3].
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)1 andWPA2 are more secured than theWEP, however it can
be complicated to setup which makes it unsuitable for domestic users. In order to enhance
security in the OSI model, most of the layers have to be secured [2]. That is the reason why,
investigating the security aspect of the physical layer is an important complement to the
security features obtained in higher layers.
Figure 1.2: Security protocols in OSI model
One of the solution to enhance the security problems in wireless communications by
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ensuring a certain confidentiality, is to secure the information in the physical layer. The
physical layer is the lowest and the most basic network layer in the OSI model (Open
System Interconnect), sending a bit stream of raw bits. This bit streammay be grouped into
symbols or words before being converted into a physical signal, and it is transmitted over a
physical transmissionmedium. To protect the transmission, the mediumwould be enough
to keep confidentiality against eavesdroppers. However the question of robustness of such
a system would appear at the same time. A good example to illustrate the benefits of
securing data in the physical layer, is the transparency and the inherency for the user. For
a domestic user with basic level in computer science, security has to be transparent and
inherent to him. Security protocols such as WEP, or WPA2, need to be set up, updated,
and are not so easy to be manipulated. To secure the physical layer, we will provide a
certain level of security and keep the security process invisible to the user.
1.2 Background technology
1.2.1 Transmission Medium
Introduction to the medium
According to [3], a medium is a link between several entities which want to exchange
information. This medium can be represented by anything, if it follows the previous defi-
nition, such as a man who repeats a sentence from another man to somebody else.
In our project, we are dealing with security in wireless communications. That’s why
we are considering "the air" as a medium, and radio waves will go through it from the
different devices to other equipments supporting wireless communications.
Let us study a very simple case with a SISO link : Figure 1.3
Figure 1.3: SISO Link
A SISO link is referred as a link with only one absolute level compare to the relative
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link, which is described later in this part of the report. In a SISO link, the information
goes from the transmitter (Single Input) to the receiver (Single Output, one sensor). At the
receiver side, we can get only one absolute level of the signal. Regarding the relative link,
MIMO can be a good example. The information goes from the transmitter (Multiple In-
puts) along different paths to the receiver (Multiple Outputs, multi-sensors), and this give
us the option to compare several absolute levels.
Many variables can be exploited to analyse the behavior of the signal over the transmis-
sion in order to keep it confidential. These variables are part of the temporal or the space
domain described below.
1. Temporal domain analysis:
In the time domain, which is a waveform analysis, one interesting propagation time-
variable is the propagation delay τ , between the transmitter and the receiver.
2. Frequency domain analysis:
Concerning the frequency domain which is a spectrum analysis, a few parameters
such as amplitude or phase can be changed by the motion of the scatterers.
3. Space domain analysis:
• The locations(x,y,z) of the transmitter and the receiver are reliable parameters
to distinguish two different nodes. Such parameters are specific to the user.
• Another interesting point to explore is the Angle Of Arrival (AOA) and the
Angle Of Departure (AOD) at the receiver and the transmitter side respectively.
4. Doppler domain analysis








• ∆f represents the maximum doppler shift
• f represents the transmitted frequency
• c represents the speed of light
• υ is the velocity of the transmitter relative to the receiver in meters/second:
positive when moving towards one another, negative when moving away
• λ is the wavelength of the transmitted signal
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As can be seen in Figure 1.3, there are different paths, due to the scatterer in this case.
That gives us a Line Of Sight (LOS) path and a Non Line Of Sight (NLOS) path.
A multi-path channel containing several paths can be presented in form of its LOS and
NLOS impulse responses or transfer functions depending on the domain that we have
chosen (respectively time or frequency).
Figure 1.4 below shows the relation between the four different representations of two
dimension links characterization [4] which depend on different variables, using the Fourier
transform.
Figure 1.4: Linear Space-variant system: System Functions
• h(xt, τ)
It represents the impulse response which depends on the time and space (Space lo-
cation of the transmitter).
• T (xt, f)
It represents the Time variant transfer function depending on the frequency (f) and
the space location of the transmitter.
• H(fd, f)
It represents the Doppler variant spreading function depending on the frequency
and the Doppler frequency.
• S(fd, τ)
It represents the Spreading function depending on the doppler frequency and the
delay.
A very important point regarding security aspects of this project is to be able to dif-
ferentiate these impulse responses or transfer functions using their parameters (frequency,
doppler shift, time and space locations). Concerning time domain, the delay can be inter-
esting to distinguish two paths. However, this variable is not enough to specify a user.
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Consequently it may become a security problem to use this parameter alone. Another
variable is the location (X,Y,Z) of the Transmitter (Tx) and the Receiver (Rx). This would
provide us the ability to distinguish with a very precise manner, one node among the oth-
ers.
Our impulse response and transfer function will take the following form:
h(τ, xt, xr)→ H(f, xt, xr) (1.2)
where xt and xr are the space locations of the transmitter and the receiver in the SISO
case. The "–>" represents the Fourier transform. The underlined symbols denote vectors.
As can be seen in the following figure, we added an eavesdropper to the SISO link.
The aim is to underline the difference between the user and the eavesdropper regarding
the impulse response and the transfer function. xr is the space location of the user and xe is
the space location of the eavesdropper. We can see that adding this space location variable
gives a specific impulse response and a transfer function to the user.
Figure 1.5: SISO link : Difference between user and eavesdropper
Inducing a change in the medium
This general description of a SISO link, reveals that this type of link is not the most efficient
to use (due to its single sensor) to get a secured transmission.
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Indeed a simple link set up with only one variable (1 antenna, 1 time delay or 1 sub
carrier) is easier to be hacked by an eavesdropper than a link with several variables.
Figure 1.6: General view of our system
In this work, our goal is to enhance the security part in order to fight against eavesdrop-
pers. Thus, the idea of how to secure the medium between AP and user is to introduce a
change in the medium.
We want to use differential information from the medium. In order to do this, we need
to compare variables with themselves using at least 2 sensors and 2 activators. Figures 1.7,
1.8, and 1.9 below illustrate what we mean by compare variables with themselves.
This kind of link is named "Relative link" and is more robust than a simple "SISO link".
By manipulating 2 variables in the same time (2 antennas, 2 time delays or 2 sub-
carriers), it now becomes more difficult for the eavesdropper to get the key to several
channels.
1.2.2 Existing principles
There are many existing methods on which it is possible to improve the security aspect.
Few of them are already more secure than the others, but can be enhanced regarding the
tradeoff between security and efficiency.
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Figure 1.7: Space Frequency
Figure 1.8: Space Time
9
Figure 1.9: Space Space
1. Space Space techniques
One technique which can be considered as space space technique is spatial multi-
plexing [5]. It multiplexes the information and transmits it via independent channels
(different bits from different antennas). Receivers need to know about the Channel
State Information (CSI). MIMO technology is the most popular technology using the
spatial multiplexing concept.
2. Space-time techniques:
Space-time coding arises from the diversity concept [5]. It relies on the transmission
of multiple and redundant copies of one data stream to the receiver over the time
and multiple antennas at the transmitter side. The objective is to sure that, in case
of tough environment, the information reaches the destination in a good quality. If
the receiver knows about the CSI, it becomes easier. However it is not mandatory to
have this condition.
There are two main Space Time Coding (STC) techniques:
• Space-Time trellis Coding technique
This STC scheme is using trellis codes. M-bit information symbols are encoded
10
Figure 1.10: Spatial Multiplexing Concept




This technique is providing diversity gain and coding gain, but is more complex
than the following STC technique, Space Time Block Coding. [6]
• Space-Time Block Coding technique
This scheme provides only diversity gain and no coding gain and is less difficult
to implement than the trellis one.
3. Space frequency techniques:
One space frequency technique is Space-Orthogonal FrequencyDivisionMultiplexing
(OFDM). Space comes from the spatial separation between themultiple antennas.The
OFDM modulation scheme provides efficient results in hostile environments with
multi-paths channels, using multiple closely spaced orthogonal sub-carriers. How-
ever improvements can be obtained using more than one antenna at the receiver side
or at the transmitter and receiver sides, which refers to Space-OFDM.
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1.3 Problem definition
This section is a detailed summary of the problem we tackle in this project and delimita-
tions that we applied. The goal of this project is to enhance security in the physical layer
in a WLAN system
1.3.1 Project motivation
The broadcasting aspect of the wireless communications compare to the difficulty of physi-
cal access in a Local Area Network (LAN), yield us to take into account the security during
a transmission [3]. In our case, we want to prevent the eavesdropper to read the transmis-
sion between the access point and the target user. That’s why in our project we are going
to focus on the confidentiality aspect which is supposed to protect the transmitted data to
be read by a stranger.
Regarding the OSI model, many protocols have already been designed to enhance se-
curity in several layers, such as WEP and WPA in Data link layer, or IPSec in the Network
layer. Adding security in most of the OSI layers would appears to be an efficient method to
secure communications, especially in the physical layer. Physical layer defines the modu-
lation, signal processing, hence it can be useful to act on it. Indeed the broadcasting aspect
of the wireless communications is one of the main source of interception hacking. More-
over, dealing with the physical layer, for a domestic user, security will be transparent and
inherent to him comparing to set up WPA protocols, that can be very complex for such a
user.
1.3.2 Differentiating the user from the eavesdropper
A very important point in order to keep the confidentiality during a transmission, is to
differentiate the user from the eavesdropper. We chose one main aspect that we can inves-
tigate between the target user and the eavesdropper.
• locations
The first difference is the localization of the user. In impulse responses, we need to
include the space locations of the transmitter and the receiver. The temporal vari-
ables with only the space locations of the transmitter are not enough specific , to be
used without spatial location variables of the receiver (target user).
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• link conditions
The link conditions,is related to the locations. The link condition deal with the path
between the target user and the transmitter. The motion of the target user, may
change the link conditions between him and the transmitter. The variation of this
link can be interesting to differentiate the target user and the eavesdropper.
1.3.3 Principle choice
As we mentioned previously in the "existing principles" part, there are several methods
related to different domains, on which we can improve security or the trade off between
efficiency and security. We are going to focus on one of these techniques regarding the
security aspect without omitting the efficiency point of view.
Spatial multiplexing
1. benefit of the spatial multiplexing technique
MIMO, stands to be the future of WLAN. We chose to focus on multiple anten-
nas techniques, because they provide higher throughput (using spatial multiplexing
technique) and improve reliability (using diversity technique). That’s why spatial
multiplexing would appear to be the suitable principle to deal with in our project.
2. Security in spatial multiplexing
Compared to the diversity concept, which transmits the same signal in each data-
stream, spatial multiplexing provides several different signals, which will be com-
bined at the receiver side to recover the original signal. This behavior can be consid-
erer as a kind of security.
Moreover, regarding the rise of MIMO technology which relies on the spatial multi-
plexing concept, it appears to be closer to the market than the other existing methods
that we mentioned previously. The security in spatial multiplexing technique be-
comes a very important point. Thus, the aim in this project focuses on the trade-off
between efficiency and security. We are going to minimize the SNIR for the eaves-
droppers, and maximizing the capacity for the target user.
The security will be investigated following these two questions:
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• How is the SNIR of eavesdropper and the capacity of the target user in a normal
case? The normal case is when no parameters are modified in the system.
• How is the capacity of the target user with a SNIR of eavesdropper close to




Spatial multiplexing MIMO system
As MIMO technology becomes more and more employed in the wireless industry, it is
important to understand the fundamentals of different techniques and their associated
benefits. The first sections of this chapter are investigating on the benefits of the MIMO
technology and especially the concept of spatial multiplexing. Other sections are dedi-
cated to the different scenarios that we defined. In these scenarios, we clarify different
parameters and we are going to act on them in order to appreciate the results.
2.1 Wireless fundamentals
A conventional scheme of a wireless system is a SISO system.
Figure 2.1: Conventional (SISO) Wireless Systems
This type of wireless system is very simple and the installation of this kind of network
is very cheap but it exists some shortcomings.
• The system is based on only one antenna in the transmit side and one antenna in the
receive side. Thus, if one of the antennas is out of service, the all system will surely
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be out of service too. One solution to this problem could be to use several antennas
and switch among them in case of one antenna would collapse.
• The only receive antenna should be able to catch the signal sent by the transmitter. So
energy is wasted by sending in all directions and it can cause additional interferences
to others.
• The system becomes quite sensitive to the interferences from all the directions.
• A single power amplifier limits the output power.
Another aspect to consider in a wireless system is the capability of the received signal
to decode the data.
Indeed to decode successfully the data transmitted, the signal strength needs to be
greater than the power of the noise plus interference by a certain amount:
• Higher data rates require higher SNIR
• Signal strength decreases with an increased range in a wireless environment.
By increasing the data rate, the first idea is to enhance the conventional single Tx and
Rx radio systems by changing different aspects of the transmission. But each aspect that
we want to change (transmit power, high gain directional antennas, more frequency spec-
trum) have some shortcomings.
Benefits of the SISO link
Conventional SISO systems were favored for simplicity and low-cost. Moreover, since the
system is set up with 1 transmitter and 1 receiver, we have only one link.
According to [7], use multiple antennas provide several benefits; for example, array
gain, diversity gain and multiplexing gain.
2.1.1 MISO(Multiple Inputs Single Output) and SIMO (Single Input Mulitple
Outputs) Systems
In these two configuration systems, two gains are available:
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1. Array gain
By using beamformers at either Tx or Rxside, we can have an average increase in the
SNR at the receiver, compared to SISO case.
2. Diversity gain
Diversity appears when the same signal is transmitted by several antennas. Thus, by
combining signals from multiple antennas, the diversity gain appears.
2.1.2 The different MIMO systems
There are several way to use multiple antennas in wireless communications and in this
section we will explore these different techniques, in MIMO channel.
Figure 2.2: Conventional(MIMO)Wireless Systems
Nowadays, MIMO scheme is becoming a key part in almost every new wireless stan-
dards and is providing an additional spatial dimension for communications.
There are three basic types of MIMO technologies:
• Beamforming technique





In a MIMO system, if we decided to transmit the same signal from each antenna, we
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have a diversity gain. This is used to improve the quality of the signal, the bit error
rate is reduced. Antennas are separated in the way to obtain independent fading of
the transmitted signal.
• Spatial Multiplexing
Compared to the other technologies, the spatial multiplexing gain offers a huge im-
provement of the capacity by transmitting different signals from the different anten-
nas.
In this project, we decided to study the additional spatial dimension provided by a




Spatial multiplexing occurs when several streams are transmitted simultaneously from the
Tx to the Rx independently, in a MIMO system. It is important to notice that the multiple
streams are transmitted simultaneously (i.e. at the same time and frequency). [8]
Let’s see more deeply, in Figure 2.3 what happens in the channel during a spatial
multiplexing communication
Figure 2.3: Spatial Multiplexing concept
The system is built to communicate with a higher total data rate due to the multiple
independent links (on the same channel) between Tx and Rx and also because of the cross-
18
paths between antennas 2.3. Please notice that the different coefficients are explained in
Figure 2.3, where hij represents the channel coefficient between the jth Tx and the ith Rx.
The received signal at Rx1 (r1) and Rx2 (r2) are
r1 = h11 · x1 + h12 · x2 (2.1)
r2 = h21 · x1 + h22 · x2 (2.2)
At the TX and RX side, signals are processed with the SVD. [9]
H = U ·D ·VH (2.3)
H: Channel transfer matrix with [.]H represents the hermitian (transpose(conj)) matrix
U: columns are the eigenvectors of HHH and form an orthonormal basis.
D: diagonal, λ1 and λ2 singular values are the square roots of the eigenvalues of bothHHH
and HHH
V: columns are the eigenvectors of HHH and form an orthonormal basis.
2.2 First Scenario: The access point knows only the target user
The first scenario is the simplest situation we can have since the Tx (access point) sends a
message to the Rx (targer user) without paying attention to any existing eavesdroppers.
In this section we are going to investigate the ability of the target user to receive the
signal. We evaluate his performance by 2 parameters (SNR and capacity) taking into ac-
count that the transmitter will focus on its transmission to maximize the capacity of the
target user. In the next section, we are going to see how the received signal is decode by
the target user.
2.2.1 Situation with the target user only
SVD for the target user
In the following part, we want to find the signal received by the target user using SVD
technique.
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Figure 2.4: Orthogonal transmission diagram in a 2× 2 system
As can be seen on the figure ( 2.4) , s is the transmitted signal vector [10] and is com-
posed by s1 and s2.
s = V · x (2.4)
V is the matrix which contains the right singular vectors ofH, and x is the input vector.
r is the received signal vector and is equal to
r = H · s+ n (2.5)
Where H is the channel matrix for the user and "n" stands for the additive noise.
Using Equation ( 2.4)
r = H ·V · x+ n (2.6)
We know the channel matrix for the target user is equal to
H = U ·D ·VH (2.7)
Where U is the matrix which contains the left singular vectors ofH,D is a diagonal matrix
which contains the singular values of H and VH means the Hermitian of the matrix V.
Then, using Equation ( 2.7) in equation Equation ( 2.6) we get
r = UDVH ·V · x+ n (2.8)
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V is a unitary matrix,so
V ·VH = I (2.9)
this gives us
r = U ·D · x+ n (2.10)
To continue after the processing, we do:
y
user
is the output vector for the target user, which contains the received signals.
y
user
= UH · r +UH · n (2.11)
Using Equation ( 2.10) that we calculated just before:
yuser = UH ·U ·D · x+UH · n (2.12)
U is an unitary matrix, so




= D · x+ n (2.14)














where λ1 and λ2 are the singular values of H which come from the matrixD.
As a result, we have two equation
yu1 = x1 · λ1 + n1 (2.16)
yu2 = x2 · λ2 + n2 (2.17)
After this part concerning the processing which is going to be used between the access
point and the target user, we are focusing the next part on the power allocation. Actually,
the way the power is shared among the antennas, is managed at the transmitter side in
order to enhance the capacity of the target user.
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Power allocation schemes
There are many different ways to share the total power among the transmit antennas. The
real goal of the power allocation is to optimize the capacity of the target user. In this section
we introduce 2 different techniques to manage the power from the access point.
• Waterfilling power allocation scheme
In the case of spatial multiplexing, the Tx knows about the channel. Hence, a water-
filling power allocation scheme is a suitable strategy to optimize the capacity of the
system.
The following theorem, which is a waterfilling technique, is called "Gallager’s water
filling theorem", which is [11]:
1
λ1
+ P1 = · · · = 1
λK
+ PK = Dl (2.18)
Where D` is the common level to fill up by the sub-channels.
As you can see in Figure 2.5, the value of the power is related to the eigenvalues of
the subchannels.
Figure 2.5: Waterfilling scheme
In figure 2.6, shows how the power is used in a 4x4 case.
The waterfilling technique is giving more power to a specified data stream (which is
a good benefit), however this leads us to have higher order modulations. One other
technique which avoids this kind of disadvantage is the Uniform Power allocation
scheme.
22
Figure 2.6: Waterfilling power allocation
• Uniform or equal power allocation scheme
In the Uniform Power Allocation (UPA) scheme, the objective is to distribute the
power as uniform manner to get a quite acceptable result. If we choose to use a
waterfilling power allocation, we would transmit with higher power through certain
data streams that are worst than the others, so it may lead to a huge waste of power.
As you can see in Figure 2.7, the value of the power is the same for each subchannel
and is not related to the eigenvalue of the subchannels.
As an example, if we choose to work with the equal power allocation:
P1




In our case (2x2 system) with Pt = 1W , P1 = P2 = 12
SNR of the target user
The Signal to Noise Ratio is defined as the ratio of a signal power to the noise power
corrupting the signal [12]. The formula to find the SNR (γk) for the target user is:




Figure 2.7: Uniform power allocation
where Pk is the power assigned to the kth data stream, p λ2k p is the eigenvalue of the
kth data stream and σ2N is the noise power.
To calculate the noise power, we are using the pre-detection of the SNR. [10]
SNRpre =
Pt ·< |H|2 >
Pn
(2.21)
Where Pt represents the total transmitted power, that we set to 1 and <.> is the expecta-
tion operator [10]. By setting this value with different values, we can choose to work with
a very noisy system (SNRpre = 6 or 10dB) or with almost no noise (SNRpre = 30dB). From
the equation ( 2.22), we get the noise power, as an average power
Pn =
Pt ·< |H|2 >
SNRpre
(2.22)
Capacity for a spatial multiplexing MIMO system
One of the main benefits offered by the spatial multiplexing , is the improvement of the
transmission rate (the capacity) using the spatial multiplexing gain.
In a multiple antenna system, we have several data streams according to the different pairs
of antennas. Spatial multiplexing technique provides a min(Nt,Nr) increase concerning
the capacity, without additional power expenditure [5], and exactly the same bandwidth,
where Nt represents the number of transmitter and Nr represents the number of receiver.
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log2(1 + γk) (2.23)
C is in b/s/Hz and K stands for the total number of sub-channel, which is also the
rank of H .




log2(1 + |λk|2 . Pk
σ2N
) (2.24)
As we mentioned previously, the capacity is enhanced without additional power ex-





In a MIMO system with K pairs of antennas. The capacity for K sub-channels will be
K times bigger than for a SISO link, when the data on the data streams are different from
each other. This capacity can be optimized using the suitable power allocation scheme.
2.2.2 Eavesdropper included
In this section, we still have the transmitter and the target user, however an eavesdropper
is trying to catch the signal. It is important to notice, that the Tx (or Access Point) does not
know about the eavesdropper. First of all, we defined a way to make the communication
the most unlistenable regarding the Signal to Interference Ratio (SIR). Secondly, we want
to find the received signal of the eavesdropper using SVD technique.
Singular Value Decomposition for the eavesdropper
Figure 2.8 shows the SVD case with both target user and an added eavesdropper.
Concerning the eavesdropper which is located at a different place from the target user,
the channel matrix is different:
He = Ue ·De ·VHe (2.26)
Where Ve is the matrix which contains the right singular vectors ofHe,
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Figure 2.8: Orthogonal transmission diagram with both target user and the eavesdropper
in a 2x2 system
then using Equation ( 2.26), Equation ( 2.4) and the following equation,
re = He · s+ n (2.27)
We obtain
re = Ue ·De ·VHe ·V · x+ n (2.28)
From this equation ( 2.28) we can choose to work before the processingUHe of the eaves-
dropper in order to get the output signal just after the received eavesdropper antennas. In
the appendix are detailed the step to get the received signal before processing equation.
y
e
is the output for the eavesdropper which contains the received signals.
y
e
= UHe · re +UHe · n (2.29)
Using the equations Equation 2.28,
y
e
= UHe ·Ue ·De ·VHe ·V · x+UHe · n (2.30)
We simplify the previous equation using Equation 2.13 , to get
ye = De ·VHe ·V · x+ n (2.31)
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respectively for the eavesdropper and the target user.
As a result, we have two received signals at the eavesdropper side.
ye1 = λe1 · (x1 · ((V ∗e11 · V11) + (V ∗e12 · V12)) + x2 · ((V ∗e11 · V21) + (V ∗e12 · V22))) + n1 (2.33)
ye2 = λe2 · (x1 · ((V ∗e21 · V11) + (V ∗e22 · V12)) + x2 · ((V ∗e21 · V21) + (V ∗e22 · V22))) + n2 (2.34)
Since we know the 2 received signal at the eavesdropper side, it will be easy to deter-
mine the quality of the transmission captured by the eavesdropper.
SNIR regarding the eavesdropper
We need to calculate SNIRe1! (SNIRe1!) and SNIRe2.





where PS the Signal Power, PI the Interference Power and PN the Noise Power.
Notice that in a 2x2 case
• SNIR1,1 is the SNIR for the first datastream and with x1 as the intended signal and
x2 as the interference.
• SNIR1,2 is the SNIR for the first datastream and with x2 as the intended signal and
x1 as the interference.
• SNIR2,1 is the SNIR for the second datastream and with x1 as the intended signal
and x2 as the interference.
• SNIR2,2 is the SNIR for the second datastream and with x2 as the intended signal
and x1 as the interference.
In this project, we used SNIR1,1 as SNIR1 and SNIR2,2 as SNIR2.
Regarding the equation ( 2.33), we obtain:
SNIRe1 =
Pe1 · (λe1 · |(V ∗e11 · V11) + (V ∗e12 · V12))|2
Pe2 · (λe1 · |((V ∗e11 · V21) + (V ∗e12 · V22))|2 + PN
(2.36)
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Regarding the equation ( 2.34), we have:
SNIRe2 =
Pe2 · (λe2 · |((V ∗e21 · V21) + (V ∗e22 · V22))|2
Pe1 · |(λe2 · ((V ∗e21 · V11) + (V ∗e22 · V12))|2 + PN
(2.37)
Capacity regarding the eavesdropper
Another parameter that we can also determine is the capacity of the eavesdropper to cap-
ture the signal. In order to find the capacity regarding the eavesdropper, we will use the
same capacity formula as the target user, with one difference. At the eavesdropper side,
it appears a lot of interferences comparing to the target user side where interferences are
cancelled by using SVD. So to determine the capacity of the eavesdropper we need SNIR
instead of SNR.




log2(1 + SNIRk) (2.38)
With all these parameters lay down, we are going to study the processing part of the
eavesdropper. Actually, the eavesdropper uses the SVD to decode the capture signal. We
wonder how the eavesdropper can enhance its ability to decode the captured signal. That
will be our study in the next section.
Combining techniques for eavesdroppers
In this part, we are going to study different combining techniques that the eavesdropper
can use to decode the signal instead of using the processing UHe (see Figure 2.4)
Diversity combining is the technique applied to combine multiple received signals of a
diversity reception device into a single improved signal. Also another aspect of the diver-
sity combining technique is to get the maximum benefit of a combined signal. The criteria
employed to measure the benefit are expressed in terms of SNR [13].
If you consider f1 and f2 as two received signals, they are respectively constituted by
a desired message component s1, s2 and an undesired additive noise component n1, n2.
Then the composite signal is:
f(t) = f1 + f2 = (s1 + s2) + (n1 + n2) (2.39)
i.e., in the form of a resultant message component (s1 + s2) plus a resultant noise com-
ponent (n1 + n2). The summed signal ( 2.39) may then be a better signal than either f1 or
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f2 alone; in particular, f(t) may have a higher local SNR with
|s1+s2|2






aj · fj(t) (2.40)
in which each fj is weighted by a combining coefficient aj , which is proportional to the
channel gain.
It exists various diversity combining techniques which can be used. All these tech-
niques can replace the initial SVD applied by the eavesdropper. The goal of this study is
to observe the influence of a combining technique at the eavesdropper side.
Below are the various diversity combining techniques which can be distinguished [13]:
• Selection Combining (SC)
• Maximal Ratio Combining (MRC)
• Equal Gain Combining (EGC)
• Optimum Combining OC
a) Selective Combining (SC)
This SC technique is one of the simplest technique. None of the CSI is required. Here
the Rx simply looks at the outputs and selects the one with the highest SNR. Thus, the
strongest signal is favored, so signals that have undergone deep fades are unlikely to
be picked by the Rx.
The design criterion here is that, at any given time, the system simply picks up the
best of all the noisy signals f1,f2,. . . ,fN , and uses that one alone; the others do not
then contribute to f(t). More precisely, let k denotes the index of a channel for which
SNRk ≥ SNRj , j=1,2,. . . ,N; then this type of system is characterized by the design
criterion
aj =
 1, forj = k0 forj 6= k (2.41)
This is essentially the classical form of diversity communication. SC has the lowest
performance and the least complexity [13]
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Figure 2.9: Selective Combining
b) Maximal Ratio Combining MRC [14]
In this technique, all the received signals are weighted proportionately to their individ-
ual SNIRs and then summed. The individual signals must be co-phased before com-
bining if it takes place before demodulation. Branches with strong signal are further
amplified, while weak signals are attenuated.
Figure 2.10: Maximum Ratio combining
In this technique, the received signals are adjusted both in magnitude and phase by
the weights in the combining filter to maximise the SNR at the output of the combiner.
The weighting applied to each diversity branch is adjusted independently from other
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branches according to the SNR at that branch. The received signal at the kth branch, yk,




aj · fj(t) (2.42)





Where (.)∗ represents the conjugate. The transmitted signal, x is corrupted by the chan-
nel effects characterised by hj ,while aj is the associated weight of the kth antenna
element [14].
c) Equal Gain Combining EGC
This linear diversity technique is characterized by the property that all channels have
exactly the same gain [13].
aj = 1, j = 1, . . . , N (2.45)






This technique is the same that the MRC combining technique but in this case, the
processing can see the difference between 2 signals in "x". Thus, for example, if we
received ye1 = a · x1 + b · x2 + n then the optimum combining will sense "a" as the
desired message, "b" as the self interference and "n" the noise.
2.3 Second scenario: The transmitter knows about the eavesdrop-
pers channel
In this section, the scenario is based on the same background than in the previous one but
here the access point is aware of the eavesdropper. So the objective for the Tx is to prevent
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Figure 2.11: Equal Gain combining
the eavesdropper to capture the signal. To achieve that, the Tx can modify some parame-
ters to make the transmission more difficult to catch for the eavesdropper.
2.3.1 Combatting eavesdroppers using singular vectors of the transmitter
The first idea to prevent an eavesdropper to capture your message is to change your trans-
mission parameters. Then, if we change dynamically what is inside the matrix V (see
Figure 2.4 the eavesdropper will have a lot of difficulties to catch the signal. On the other
hand, the target user will have a lot of difficulties since the orthogonality between the
target user and the access point won’t be satisfied and a lot of interferences could not be
erased in the target user processing. Consequently, we can not modify the matrix Vwhich
contains the right singular vectors of H. Otherwise, we have another alternative against
the eavesdropper: we can try to deteriorate its signal by playing on the power allocation.
2.3.2 Combatting eavesdroppers using the inter datastreams SNIR
In order to keep confidentiality against eavesdroppers, we define a strategy to follow in a
question form. Our objective is to secure our multiple antenna system on the confidential-
ity aspect, but also to keep it efficient enough regarding the capacity of the target user. Our
strategy is as follow:
• If the SNIR at the eavesdropper side is minimize to 0dB, what is then the maximum
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value that the capacity can reach at the target user side?
To clarify this, we focus at the eavesdropper side, to analyze each data stream power
comparing to the others.
The figure below is an example with two subchannels.
Figure 2.12: Eavesdropper SIR (2 data streams example)
As can be seen in the Figure 2.12, we have two data streams. The SIR (explained just
before this figure) among these two subchannels is used to prevent the eavesdropper to
intercept the signal at a good quality level.
Investigating The Signal to Interference Ratio(SNIR)
Having the capacity concerning the eavesdropper, it is interesting to see what is happening





New Power allocation: French Power Allocation
To get a SNIR equal to 0dB, the only possibility is to use a suitable new power allocation.
Indeed, the weighting vectors (V and U) cannot be modified because the orthogonality of
the system (SVD) must not be changed. In the following picture is described how we are
going to deteriorate the eavesdropper’s SNIR.
For this scenario we fix P2, we apply the strategy in Figure 2.13 andwe compare the ca-
pacity of the target user versus the SNIR of the eavesdropper with the same methodology
than for the first scenario.
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Figure 2.13: Scenario2 strategy: New power allocation
2.4 Chapter 2 Summary
In this chapter, we defined two different scenarios. First case where the tTx (Access Point)
doesn’t know about the eavesdropper, and the second case, where the Access Point de-
tected the eavesdropper.
2.4.1 The transmitter and the target user
In this scenario, we are going to observe the capacity of the MIMO system based on the
spatial multiplexing concept. We will change the value of some parameters to compare the
results obtained.
1. We start with a 2x2 MIMO system
2. Power allocation scheme (Waterfilling or Uniform)
2.4.2 The transmitter, the target user and several eavesdroppers
Here, we added some eavesdroppers who want to catch the transmitted signal. Now, our
interests are still the capacity for the target but also the SIR among the data streams of the
eavesdroppers.
We will change the same parameters than for the first scenario.
1. We start with a 2x2 MIMO system
2. Power allocation scheme (Waterfilling or Uniform)
However we will need also to appreciate the behavior of the SIR and the Capacity when:
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1. We change the distance between the eavesdropper and the target user
Moreover, we would like to get a comparative figure between the capacity and the SNIR,
to appreciate both of their behavior.
2.4.3 Processing
We decided to change the processing at the eavesdropper side to find out the importance
of the processing on the eavesdropper and also to figure out on the ability of our system
to be robust and secure against any type of eavesdropper.
2.4.4 Deteriorate the signal received by the eavesdropper
In this second scenario, we want to deteriorate the signal that the eavesdropper is going to
catch. So to do that we are going to change some parameters which can be:




With the theoretical background of this project laid down in the previous chapter, we will
now present the simulated system models. The primary focus of this work is to determine
the ability of an eavesdropper to capture the transmitted signal. In this Chapter we will
first describe the different systemmodel we used for our simulation, followed by detailing
out the different scenarios under investigation.
3.1 System model: The 802.11n Channel Model
The first channel model that has been investigated is the 802.11n channel model, also called
World-Wide Spectrum Efficiency (WWiSE) or TGn Sync. This model is very related to this
project, due to the fact that this standard is also specialized inMIMO system. This standard
is a very recent one, and the publication is currently expected in September 2008.
We started to go through the 802.11n channel model simulated in matlab "MATLAB
implementation of the Indoor MIMOWLAN channel model proposed by the IEEE 802.11
TGn Channel Model Special Committe". We went through the documents related to the
matlab simulation, explaining the different environments, the functions, and how to use
it.
In the appendix section we describe more deeply the 802.11n Channel model in Matlab,
and what we learned from this model. Unfortunately, after studying deeply this system
we realized that the 802.11n channel model could not be used for our project.
3.1.1 Why not the 802.11n channel model
We gathered here the reasons why we did not use it for our simulations.
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• The numerous functions
The 802.11n channel model Matlab program is a very complicated channel model
and is containing several different environments(A to F). This channel model is tak-
ing into account many details usingmany functions, which all may not be interesting
for our case. We tried to minimize this program in order to get only the functions
that we wanted to use. However this model is a very complicated program and
all the functions are not so easy to remove without affecting the others. Finally we
oriented our choice by an easier and more suitable channel model "The double scat-
tering model".
3.2 System model: Double Scattering Environment
After the first system model, we decided to use a second one which has been used for
the paper "The Medium is The Message Secure Communication via Waveform Coding in
MIMO Systems" [10]. We get this system model thanks to Xin Zhou who was involved
in this paper. The idea was to recode some function by ourselves to appropriate the code.
Thus, we redone the function dedicated to position the different eavesdroppers from the
target user and the function dedicated to generate the channel matrix.
In this part we are going to describe the system model that we used for our simu-
lation. The simulation model includes a narrowband system with one target user and
several eavesdroppers. At the starting point, a 2x2 system is assumed in a narrowband
environment with double scatter rings of 20m of radius around the transmitter and the
target user(receiver). The radio channel is simulated using a double bounce flat-fading
Rayleigh model, with 100 scatterers on each scatter ring. The separation between Tx and
Rx is 30m. The center frequency(fc) is 5GHz so the wavelength is λ = 6cm. (See Figure 3.1)
The Tx and the Rx are assumed Uniform Linear Arrays with Antenna element spacing
dTx = dRx = λ/2 . 4 Tx elements are static and the 4 Rx elements move along X tracks
perpendicular to the antenna array, with a movement step of λ/2. The spacing between
different tracks is 0.4λ. (See Figure 3.2)
As can be seen in Figure ( 3.2), in the right part of the target user, several eavesdrop-
pers, set up with 2 receiver elements, are placed in order to catch the signal received by
the target user. We consider all users to the right of the target user as eavesdroppers fol-
lowing the same track rule than the target user. On the other hand, the distance between
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Figure 3.1: Channel Model Double Scattering
Figure 3.2: Channel Model Focus on the antennas in a 4x4 system











All of these distances start from the target user and are more or less near the target user
in order to compare the efficiency of the eavesdropper to catch a good signal.(see Figure
( 3.3))
The systemmodel takes into account that the scatters are located in the far-field, which
guarantees the angular field distribution being essentially independent of distance from
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Figure 3.3: Channel Model Double focus on eavesdroppers
the antennas. [15].The far-field region can be calculated by 2(DA)
2
λ , where DA is the an-
tenna dimension and λ is the wavelength. [16]
In this model, 100 scatterers are randomly distributed on each scatter ring (see figure
3.4). The propagation path is a two-bounce transmission mode, where LOS does not exist
in this preliminary assumption.Figure ( 3.4) is showing the environment assumption with
4 paths as an instance.
Figure 3.4: Channel Model Propagation path
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3.2.1 Parameter Configuration
In the simulation experiment, the carrier frequency fc is set to 5GHz. Therefore, the wave-







Where c denotes the light speed. The other parameters are listed in Table below
Simulations Parameters
Carrier Frequency (fc) 5GHz
Wavelength (λ) 0.06m
Number of Tx antenna (NTX ) 2
Number of RX antenna (NRX ) 2
Number of Scatterers on Each Scatter Ring (Ns) 100
Number of paths 800
Distance between transmitter antennas(dTx) λ2
Distance between receiver antennas (dRx) λ2
Number of Rx movements in the row 10
Number of Rx tracks in the column 500
SNRpre 6,10,30 dB
Transmitted Power (Pt) 1 dB
Number of Eavesdroppers 59
Number of target user 1
The matlab plot below figure3.5 shows the representation of the double scattering
model.
3.2.2 Summary of the assumptions of the simulation model
1. Only NLOS paths are considered
2. Respect the Rayleigh rule of thumb
3. Transmitter is static
4. Receivers (Target user and eavesdroppers) are moving
5. Receivers do not cross the circle of scatterers
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Figure 3.5: Plot of the Channel Model Propagation path
6. 100 scatterers on the circles
7. Noise is set using SNR pre-detection 6,10,30 dB
8. The channel matrix obtained by the channel model has been normalized
3.2.3 Verification of the model
Our simulation model considers only NLOS paths, hence we are going to check whether
this model is rayleigh or not. We need to show that there is no correlation among the
paths, due to the fact that we are in spatial multiplexing. To conclude this verification of
the model, we will show the space coherence function.
Rayleigh Model
In this part, we are investigating the different links (h11, h12, h21, h22). We are trying to
find out if the channel link respects the Rayleigh distribution in a two by two case. As can
be seen on each plot, it follows the Rayleigh rule of thumb, that is at 1% signal level, the
power is -20dB. You can find these plots in the appendix section.
Correlation coefficients
As long as we are in spatial multiplexing, we need uncorrelated links, that is the reason
why we verified the complex correlation coefficients between all the links.
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Correlation coefficients
h11 h12 h21 h22
h11 1 0.0392 0.067 0.0037
h12 0.0392 1 0.0922 0.2277
h21 0.067 0.0922 1 0.0938
h22 0.0037 0.2277 0.0938 1
Spatial coherence function of the model
The Space Coherence Function (SCF) is used to manifest the normalized distance autocor-
relation function. It expresses the distance along which the channel holds the similarity
[17].
Figure 3.6: Space coherence function
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Eigenvalue distribution
In this part, we are going to deal with the eigenvalue distribution. This figure will help us
to be sure that our system is well set up.
Figure 3.7: Eigenvalues distribution 2× 2case
In the Figure 3.7 just above, the 50% level indicates a difference of 10dB between these
2 eigenvalues.To make sure that our distribution gives a good response, we compare our
difference to the Jakes’ model [17], which gather all standard distributions we need. Thus,
by checking in this book, we have the confirmation that our figure are what we expected
with respect to [17].
The next figure is the eigenvalue distribution for a 4x4 case.
Figure 3.8: Eigenvalues distribution 4× 4case
We can notice in the Figure 3.8 that the two first eigenvalue are close from each other
comparing to the 2x2 case. It is what we should expected for with respect to [17]
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3.3 The different scenarios
We defined two main scenarios. The first one is dedicated to observe the behavior of the
eavesdropper SNIR. We actually study the performance of the system when the eaves-
dropper is trying to catch the message. Thus, we compare the capacity of the target user
versus the SNIR of the eavesdropper before the processing in the first time and we try, in
the second time, different processing to observe the response of the system model.
For the second scenario, we are going to do the same procedure than for the first one except
that we will try to force the signal caught by the eavesdropper to be very bad.
3.3.1 Scenario1: Observation Scenario / Blind transmission
In this observation scenario, the Tx (access point) is not able to detect the presence of any
eavesdroppers around him. Thus the term "Blind transmission" means that the transmitter
is able to see the target user only. It is totaly blind with all the elements around him, hence
the access point is not able to have any influence on the eavesdroppers transmission.
Post processing part
In this sub-scenario, what me mean by "post processing" is that we are taking into account
the UH in the received signal equation.
Figure 3.9: Equations to use after the processing
For this sub-scenario, we want to examine different behaviors of our system in chang-
ing different parameters.
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• Study of the capacity of the target user using different power allocation schemes
The first behavior to observe is the capacity of the target user regarding the two
different power allocations (Uniform power allocation scheme and the Waterfilling
power allocation scheme). Figure 3.10 shows the detailed steps to calculate. The goal
of this study is to illuminate how important is the influence of the power allocation
in our system.
Figure 3.10: Capacity function
• Study of the SNR of the target user regarding the SNIR of the eavesdroppers
The two different SNR (one for each received antennas in the 2x2 system)of the target
user is another interesting behavior to study, regarding the different SNIR of most of
the eavesdroppers (the closest and the farthest from the target user).
Moreover for a deeper study, wewill apply the two different power allocation schemes.
Pre processing part
Actually we want to explore which kind of signal we can get and above all what kind of
SNIR it will give for the eavesdropper.
Here, we want to examine different behaviors of our system in changing different pa-
rameters at the eavesdropper side.
• Study of the SNIR of the eavesdroppers without any processing
Looking at the SNIR of the eavesdropper before any processing, comparing the SNR
of the target user may be interesting. The goal of this study is to find out the influence
of the processing for the eavesdroppers to catch the signal between the access point
and the target user.
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Figure 3.11: Equations to use before the processing
We will appreciate our results using the two different power allocations (Uniform
and the Waterfilling scheme).
Processing part
The processing scenario is interesting from the eavesdropper but also for the systemmodel.
We want to explore which techniques would appear to be the most suitable to get the best
SNIR for the eavesdropper. In order to do that, we just remove the processing (UHe ) and
we try to replace that processing by different combining techniques at the eavesdroppers
side.
• SVD eavesdropper side
No change is apply in the processing comparing to the first scenario.
• Combining techniques
Instead of getting into theUHe processing, wewill apply the three different combining
techniques.
1. EGC (see Figure 3.12)
2. MRC (see Figure 3.13)
3.3.2 Scenario 2: The transmitter knows about the eavesdropper
In this scenario, the Tx (access point) is able to detect the presence of any eavesdropper
around it. Thus the access point can have an influence on the eavesdropper transmission
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Figure 3.12: Equal Gain Combining Strategy
Figure 3.13: Maximum Ratio Combining Strategy
by changing the power allocation. By the equation ( 2.35), we can see the power transmit-
ted to the eavesdropper plays an important role in the SNIR calculation.
The interesting point here is that if SNIR is approximatively equal to 1(=0 dB), it means
that the power of the received signal is almost equal to the power of the interference re-
ceived by the eavesdropper. In this manner, it would be very difficult for the eavesdropper
to capture the transmitted message.
Regarding to this point, we plan to apply the strategy displayed in Figure 2.13 to deterio-
rate to the maximum of the SNIR at the eavesdropper
• The objective here is to get a trade off between the capacity of the target user and the
SNIR of the eavesdropper.
Therefore, for the scenario 2 we are going to apply the same procedure than the first
one ( Capacity versus SNIR) but taking into account that the power allocation will be set
up in order to deteriorate the signal received by the eavesdropper.
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3.4 Chapter 3 Summary
In this chapter, we explained why we stopped to use the system model 802.11n.
We introduce another system model: the double scattering environment [10].
We finally described howwe intended to implement the two scenarios saw in the previous
chapter.




This chapter is dedicated to the results of our Matlab simulation. We are going to present
all the results of the different scenarios. The results will be presented for each scenario
regarding the SNIR of the eavesdropper and the capacity or the SNR of the target User at
the same time. Before the practical results, an theoretical analysis will presented in order
to inform the reader about the expected practical results.
The table below, is a brief reminder of the different parameters that we changed during
the simulations of all the scenarios.
Simulation parameters
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Power allocation Waterfilling / Uniform New power allocation
SNRpredetection 30dB/6dB 30dB/6dB
Figure 4.1: Simulations parameters table
It is important to know, before going through the analysis of the results, that the level
of the SNRpre tells about the noise power level. In case of high SNRpre(30dB), we almost
have any noise power. However in case of low SNRpre(6dB), we need to take into account
the noise power.
The table ?? gathers all the informations concerning the eavesdroppers that we are us-
ing during the simulations.
Below is a brief summary of the different processing used by the eavesdroppers:
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Eavesdroppers locations
Distance from the target user (λ)
Eavesdropper 1 λ100
Eavesdropper 2 λ10
Eavesdropper 12 2 · λ
Figure 4.2: Eavesdroppers locations table
1. Preprocessing
The eavesdroppers will not apply any processing to the received signals. It is the
case for the eavesdroppers with only the antennas.
2. SVD
This is the processing used by the target user to remove the interferences. However
the eavesdroppers will have interferences using this processing.
3. EGC
First combining technique, which cophases the signals, and adds them together,
without being able to distinguish x1 from x2.
4. MRC
Second combining technique, is to cophase, to multiply signals by a gain which has
to be proportional to their SNIR, and sum the signals at the eavesdropper side. In
this algorithm, the eavesdropper using MRC is not able to distinguish the two infor-
mation signals (x1 and x2).
5. OC! (OC!)
Third and last combining technique, is following the same algorithm than the MRC
technique. The difference relies on the ability of the eavesdropper to distinguish the
two information signals (x1 and x2).
4.1 Theoretical analysis
4.1.1 Preprocessing theoretical analysis







From this question ( 2.10) we can choose to work before the processingUH of the target
user in order to get the received signal just after the receiver antennas.


















 U11 · λ1 U12 · λ2








r1 = λ1 · U11 · x1 + λ2 · U12 · x2 + n1 (4.3)
r2 = λ1 · U21 · x1 + λ2 · U22 · x2 + n2 (4.4)
SNIR1.1 (x1 is the intended signal , and x2 is taking as interference) is calculated using
the term related to x1 (λ1 · U21) over the term related to x2(λ2 · U12).
SNIR1.1 =
|λ1 · U11|2 · P1
|λ2 · U12|2 · P2 + Pn (4.5)
• High SNRpre
In high SNRpre (= 30dB), we have almost no noise (then we assume PN = 0).
• Equal power allocation




|λ2 · U12|2 (4.6)
We looked at the values of the ratio |U11|
2
|U12|2 and it gives at median level (50%), a value
equal to 1.(Please see Figure 4.3)
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We looked at the values of the ratio |λ1|
2
|λ2|2 and it gives at median level (50%), a value
equal to 12,5 Which represents (10, 96dB).
We looked at the values of the ratio |λ2|
2
|λ1|2 and it gives at median level (50%), a value
equal to 0.08 Which represents (−10, 95dB).
When we look at the difference between the Eigenvalues from Jakes book, we have
10dB difference.
(|λ1|2)dB − (|λ2|2)dB = (10)dB (4.9)
which is equal to this equation,
10 · log10
|λ1|2
|λ2|2 = 10 · log10 10 (4.10)
Then we need
|λ1|2
|λ2|2 = 10 (4.11)
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Figure 4.4: Cdf of the Ratio |λ1|
2
|λ2|2 2by2
Figure 4.5: Cdf of the Ratio |λ2|
2
|λ1|2 2by2
This ratio gives 10 in dB from this equation, and we got 10,7 dB for this ratio in our simu-
lation result.
Now we look at the contrary
(|λ2|2)dB − (|λ1|2)dB = −(10)dB (4.12)
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which is equal to this equation,
10 · log10
|λ2|2
|λ1|2 = 10 · log10 0.1 (4.13)
Then we need
|λ2|2
|λ1|2 = 0.1 (4.14)
This ratio gives -10 in dB from this equation, and we got -10,9 dB for this ratio in our SNIR
simulation result.
Then from Jakes book, we have (10dB - (-10dB))20dB difference between the two SNIR
in a 2by2 system. In our simulation results , we have (10,9dB- (-10,9))then 21dB of differ-
ence between the two SNIR.
As a conclusion, we verified our practical results regarding the theoretical result of
SNIR preprocessing for the target user. We will be able to verify the rest of the results con-
cerning the SNIR preprocessing, based on the target user SNIR preprocessing theoretical
result.
4.1.2 Post Processing (SVD) theoretical analysis
We are going to study the value of the SNR of the target user at SNRpredetection = 30dB
with uniform power allocation. The value of the SNIR of the eavesdropper1 ( λ100 , the
closest from the target user) should be almost the same than the SNR of the target user.
These are the two received signals by the target user (y1 and y2):
y1 = λ1 · x1 + n1 (4.15)
y2 = λ2 · x2 + n2 (4.16)





with Pn = 0.001W , P1 = 0.5w and |λ1|2=3.1623 (At 50% level, which means 5dB, see





with Pn = 0.001W , P2 = 0.5w and |λ2|2=0.3467 (At 50% level, which means -4.6 dB, see
Figure 3.7) then the value of SNR2.2 should be 22.38dB at 50% level.
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If we look at the Figure 4.6, below, the values of the SNR that we obtained during the
simulation are the same than the expected theoretical results.
Figure 4.6: SNR postprocessing Target user SNRpre30dB 2by2
The theoretical analysis showed that our simulation results concerning the SNR target
user are correct. Now, we are expecting the SNIR of the eavesdroppers almost similar than
the SNR value of the target user, to verify our post processing SVD simulation results.
4.1.3 Post Processing (MRC) theoretical analysis
To get the following equations r1 and r2, please refer to the calculation which have been
achieved in the appendix A.
r1 = λ1 · U11 · x1 + λ2 · U12 · x2 + n1 (4.19)
r2 = λ1 · U21 · x1 + λ2 · U22 · x2 + n2 (4.20)











g1 = (λ1 · U11 + λ2 · U12)∗ = λ1 · U∗11 + λ2 · U∗12 (4.23)
g2 = (λ1 · U21 + λ2 · U22)∗ = λ1 · U∗21 + λ2 · U∗22 (4.24)
We developed y1 and y2,
y1 =












[|λ1|2 · |U21|2 + λ1 · U21 · λ2 · U∗22] · x1 + [|λ2|2 · |U22|2 + λ1 · U∗21 · λ2 · U22] · x2 + (λ1 · U∗21 + λ2 · U∗22) · n2
PN
(4.28)
U is a unitary matrix. So, U11 · U∗12 = U∗11 · U12 = 0
y1 =




|λ1|2 · |U21|2 · x1 + |λ2|2 · |U22|2 · x2 + (λ1 · U∗21 + λ2 · U∗22) · n2
PN
(4.30)
Now, we sum the two signals y1 and y2,
y1+y2 =
(|U11|2 + |U21|2) · |λ1|2 · x1 + (|U12|2 + |U22|2) · |λ2|2 · x2 + (λ1 · U∗11 + λ2 · U∗12) · n1 + (λ1 · U∗21 + λ2 · U∗22) · n2
PN
(4.31)
U is a unitary matrix. So, |U211|+ |U221| = |U212|+ |U222| = 1
Finally,
y1 + y2 =
|λ1|2 · x1 + |λ2|2 · x2 + (λ1 · U∗11 + λ2 · U∗12) · n1 + (λ1 · U∗21 + λ2 · U∗22) · n2
PN
(4.32)
This is useful to calculate the SNIR1.1 (where x1 is the intended signal and x2 the in-
terference)
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However, since we are in uniform power allocation, the powers (P1 and P2 are equal)
will cancel each other. Moreover, the SNRpre = 30dB tells us that the noise will be very
small (quasi null), then we can remove the term "PN ".
Back to SNIR calculation






We know that at mean value, the term (|λ1|
2)
(|λ2|2) is equal to 12,5 from our simulation results.
Then the SNIR is equal to (12.5)2 = 150.25
SNIRdB1.1 = 10 ∗ log10 150.25 = 21.7dB (4.34)
Then using the MRC technique, we should expect a value of around 20dB at 50% level.
As can be seen on the figure below which concerns the target user and also the closest
eavesdropper ( λ100 )(They should have the same SNIR, due to their positions close from
each other), we have a value of about 19dB at 50% level.
Figure 4.7: MRC SNIR1 SNRpre=30dB Uniform Power allocation
Finally, we can conclude that we got the expected theoretical result in our simulation
concerning the MRC technique relative to the SNIR.
Let’s move to the practical results and analysis of our simulations.
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4.2 MATLAB simulation : First scenario
First of all, the capacities of the target user at SNRpre = 30dB and 6dB are presented. Then
we focused on the different processing, showing the SNIR of the eavesdroppers(at differ-
ent positions: Lambda/100,Lambda/10 and 2Lambda), (where any kind of processing are
applied to the received signals,SVD, EGC,MRC).
4.2.1 Capacity of the target User
Below are the two Matlab plots of the capacity of the target user in Waterfilling and Uni-
form power allocation. They have been achieved at SNRpre = 6dB and SNRpre = 30dB,
which means respectively high and low noise power level.
Figure 4.8: Capacity Target user
SNR=6dB
Figure 4.9: Capacity Target user
SNR=30dB
• Power allocation
On the left picture 4.8,as can be seen on this two capacities. Waterfilling gives a better
result than Uniform power allocation. This is due to the fact that in case of high noise
power level, waterfilling is acting like a switch among the two data streams and is
able to give more power to the most interesting data-stream. On the contrary, on the
right picture 4.9,Waterfilling and uniform power allocation approach the same re-
sult. In case of low noise, waterfilling strategy will be similar to the uniform strategy
and will distribute the total transmitted power equally among the data streams.
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• High noise power
As can be seen in Figure 4.8, the capacity reach a value of 4 b/s/Hz in waterfilling
power allocation. This value is quite small, and it is due to the noise power level.
On the contrary, in low noise power level (right picture ??), the capacity is much
better than for the case SNRpre = 6dB and can reach the value of 18 b/s/Hz both in
waterfilling and uniform power allocation.
4.2.2 The different kind of processing for the eavesdropper
Let us focus on the following cases where the eavesdropper is doing any kind of processing
with the received signal. Then the eavesdropper may apply an SVD processing. It could
also have a kind of combining technique processing (such as EGC,MRC). We will start this
analysis with SNRpre = 6dB and then SNRpre = 30dB (where we are going to compare
the different processing in uniform and then waterfilling).
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Different processing: Uniform at SNR=6dB
Figure 4.10: SNIR Preprocessing Figure 4.11: SNIR Postprocessing SVD
Figure 4.12: SNIR Postprocessing EGC Figure 4.13: SNIR Postprocessing MRC
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Figure 4.14: SNR Postprocessing SVD
Different processing: Results analysis
• Power allocation
We used in the group of pictures above, the uniform power allocation.
• Noise power level
In the above group of figures, we are at high noise power (i.e: SNRpre), that is the
reason why the results of the SNIR are not at high values.
• Best processing
As can be seen, comparing the whole group, the best processing for the eavesdrop-
pers to achieve their best SNIR is the SVD processing 4.11, which is the only one to
approach the result of the SNR result of the target user 4.19. However this is true
only if the eavesdropper is very close from the target user (λ/100,λ/10).
• When the eavesdropper goes away from the target user
When the eavesdropper is at farther locations from the target user. It can be easily
seen, that the SNIR of the eavesdropper is very poor for the SVD 4.11 processing.
The best processing in that case would appear to be the MRC 4.13 technique, which
provide a not so big difference between SNIR of the different eavesdroppers.
• Slopes of the curves
It is also interesting to see in the SVD picture 4.11, that the slope of the first eaves-
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dropper is quite small, which means a quite good stability. However we can see that
once the eavesdropper goes away from the target user, this slope starts to increase
very quickly. From this point, the combining technique provides small slope for the
curves then more stability for the SNIR of the eavesdropper, except for the closest
eavesdroppers from the target user.
Different processing: Waterfilling at SNR=6dB
Figure 4.15: SNIR Preprocessing Figure 4.16: SNIR Postprocessing SVD
Figure 4.17: SNIR Postprocessing EGC Figure 4.18: SNIR Postprocessing MRC
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Figure 4.19: SNR Postprocessing SVD
Different processing: Results analysis
• Power allocation
We used in the group of pictures above, the waterfilling power allocation. It can be
seen on the above group of pictures, that in all the cases, waterfilling power allocation
provides slightly better results in SNIR for all the processing. It is still because in case
of high noise power level, waterfilling is acting like a switch among the two data
streams and is able to give more power to the most interesting data-stream.
• Noise power level
In the above group of figures, we are at high noise power (i.e: SNRpredetection), that
is the reason why the results of the SNIR are not at high values.
• Best processing
As can be seen, comparing the whole group, the best processing for the eavesdrop-
pers to achieve their best SNIR is the SVD processing 4.11, which is the only one to
approach the result of the SNR result of the target user 4.19. However this is true
only if the eavesdropper is very close from the target user (λ/100,λ/10).
• When the eavesdropper goes away from the target user
When the eavesdropper is at farther locations from the target user, we can observe
the same behavior than in uniform case, however it is interesting to see that the gap
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between the eavesdropper1 and 12 is less than before, which means that even farther
eavesdroppers start to get a better SNIR than in uniform case.
• Slopes of the curves
We can observe the same behavior than for the Uniform case, however it is interest-
ing to see, that we have a bit more stability in SVD processing for the eavesdropper12
comparing to the uniform case. Nevertheless, to get more stability for all the eaves-
dropper in average, it is still better to use combining techniques (such as MRC, or
EGC).
Different processing: Waterfilling/Uniform at SNR=30dB
Figure 4.20: SNIR Preprocessing Figure 4.21: SNIR Postprocessing SVD
Different processing: Results analysis
• Power allocation
We used in the group of pictures above, the uniform power allocation. At high
SNRpredetection (about 30dB), waterfilling will approach the strategy of the uniform,
and then, we will almost have the same results. That is the reason why, we only
showed the uniform power allocation at SNRpre = 30dB.
• Noise power level
In the above group of figures, we are at low noise power (i.e: SNRpre = 30dB), that
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Figure 4.22: SNIR Postprocessing EGC Figure 4.23: SNIR Postprocessing MRC
Figure 4.24: SNR Postprocessing SVD
is the reason why the results of the SNIR are really better than at 6dB.
• Best processing
As can be seen, comparing the whole group, the best processing for the eavesdrop-
pers to achieve their best SNIR is still the SVD processing, almost the same than the
target user for the eavesdropper 1. However, using SVD at SNRpre = 30dB, the
eavesdroppers 2 and 12 have very bad SNIR comparing to the eavesdropper1.
• When the eavesdropper goes away from the target user
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When the eavesdropper is at farther locations from the target user, the SVD pro-
cessing gives very poor results (Eavesdropper2 and 12). On the contrary, combining
techniques (EGC and MRC) are giving pretty good results for all the eavesdroppers,
even the farthest (1,2 and 12).
• Slopes of the curves
We can observe the same behavior than the other cases, more stability for the eaves-
droppers usingMRC or EGC in general. And quite good stability for SVD processing
for the eavesdropper 1 only (Closest from target user).
4.2.3 Conclusion of scenario1
As a conclusion of the first scenario, we gathered the observations made during the analy-
sis of the results:
1. What is the best processing for the eavesdropper
SVD is the best processing for the eavesdroppers to catch the best SNIR.
2. One condition to get a good SNIR once the eavesdropper starts to go away from the
target user, its SNIR will get a quite poor level, even in SVD processing.
To conclude on this first scenario, we could say that the SVD processing is already
enough robust to keep the confidentiality (even if it is the best processing for the eaves-
dropper to get a good SNIR).
However, wemay be able to optimize this confidentiality and reduce the SNIR of the eaves-
dropper, even for the closest eavesdroppers. While reducing the SNIR, we will pay atten-
tion to the capacity of the target user.
4.3 Second scenario
This scenario considers that the access point knows the target user, but also the eavesdrop-
pers. That is the reason why, the access point is going to reduce as much as it can the SNIR
of the eavesdroppers.
We only investigated an MRC and preprocessing for the eavesdroppers. EGC is not so
interesting for this scenario, because its results should have the same tendency than MRC
with lower values. We are going to compare the SNIR of the eavesdroppers (using MRC
processing and preprocessing for each step) with the SNR of the target user (which is using
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SVD processing for each step), and also the capacity of the eavesdroppers (still using MRC
processing and preprocessing) and the capacity of the target user (Still in SVD processing).
Below are the two main points of the scenario 2:
1. Reducing the SNIR of the eavesdroppers acting on the allocation of power.
2. Looking at the capacity and SNR of the target user regarding the new power alloca-
tion.
We gathered the results regarding their SNRpre (6dB and 30dB)
4.3.1 SNIR With SNRpre = 6dB
Here are presented the results of the SNIR of the eavesdroppers using two different pro-
cessing:
• Without any processing
• MRC processing
We compare the eavesdroppers SNIR to the SNR of the target user (using SVD processing).
We only showed the SNIR1.1 and not the SNIR2.2. The reason is that the SNIR2.2 is really
lower than the SNIR1.1.
Figure 4.25: SNIR Preprocessing Figure 4.26: SNR Target User SVD
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Figure 4.27: SNIR MRC processing Figure 4.28: SNR Target User SVD
• Deteriorating the SNIR
As can be seen on the above figure related to the preprocessing case 4.25, the two
eavesdroppers SNIR go to the negative values using the "French power allocation".
Concerning theMRC case using the French power allocation, the two SNIR go to 0dB
at 50% level 4.27.
• Power allocation results In all the case, the waterfilling power allocation provides
the best result, slightly better than uniform power allocation. As it has been said
in the first scenario, it is because in case of high noise power, waterfilling power
allocation is acting as a switch among the different data-streams. It optimizes the
values of the SNIR and capacity, for both target user and eavesdroppers.
• SNR of the target user
Comparing to the SNR of the target user in Uniform and Waterfilling power alloca-
tion, the SNR using the French power allocation is at a quite poor value at SNRpre =
6dB. This is due to the French power allocation which deteriorates the SNIR of the
eavesdroppers but also bring changes at the target user side. We also can have a look
at the slopes of the curves on the figures related to the SNR of the target user 4.28,
which are bigger in the case of French power allocation. A bigger slope means less
stability, because a wider range of values becomes available.
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4.3.2 Capacity With SNRpre = 6dB
Figure 4.29: Capacity Preprocessing Figure 4.30: Capacity Target User SVD
Figure 4.31: Capacity MRC Figure 4.32: Capacity Target User SVD
• Deteriorating the SNIR
As can be seen on the above figure related to the preprocessing case 4.29, the two
eavesdroppers SNIR have very poor capacities using the "French power allocation"(about
0.5b/s/Hz at 50% level). Concerning the MRC case using the French power alloca-
tion, the two eavesdroppers can get better capacities( C=2b/s/Hz at 50%level) than
in preprocessing( C=0.5 b/s/Hz at 50%level), it comes from the processing of MRC
69
which improves the SNIR as we showed during the first scenario. However their val-
ues have been really reduced comparing to the waterfilling and uniform cases (about
C=6b/s/Hz at 50% level).
• Power allocation results
Still, In all the cases, thewaterfilling power allocation provides the best result, slightly
better than uniform power allocation.
• Capacity of the target user
Comparing to the capacity of the target user in Uniform and Waterfilling power al-
location, the capacity obtained using the French power allocation is at a quite poor
value at SNRpre = 6dB 4.32. This comes from the SNR of the target user which
have been reduced by the French power allocation. We also can observe the same
tendency regarding the slopes of the curves on the figures related to the capacity of
the target user 4.32. These slopes are very good stability indexes.
Let’s move to the high SNRpre (30dB, which means low noise power), with the same
steps followed at SNRpre = 6dB.
4.3.3 SNIR With SNRpre = 30dB
Figure 4.33: SNIR Preprocessing Figure 4.34: SNR Target User SVD
• Deteriorating the SNIR
As we did before, our French power allocation has reduced the SNIR of the eaves-
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Figure 4.35: SNIR Eavesdropper MRC Figure 4.36: SNR Target User SVD
droppers 1 and 12 in preprocessing andMRC cases. As can be seen on the figure 4.35,
the SNIR affected by the french power allocation are better than in the preprocessing
case. This is still due to the MRC combining technique which provides a better SNIR
than the processing
• Power allocation results
It is interesting to see that in this case of low noise power, waterfilling and uniform
power allocation give the same result(that is the reason why we gathered them on
the figures). This observation has already been made during the first scenario, the
waterfilling can not work as a switch since there is almost any noise power.
• SNR of the target user
Comparing to the SNR of the target user in Uniform and Waterfilling power allo-
cation 4.36, the SNR using the French power allocation is at a quite poor value at
SNRpre = 30dB. We also can consider the slopes of the curves on the figures re-
lated to the SNR of the target user 4.36, which are bigger in the case of French power
allocation, then we have less stability.
After analyzing the results of the SNIR of eavesdroppers and the SNR of the target user,
let’s look at these results in term of capacity.
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Figure 4.37: Capacity Preprocessing Figure 4.38: Capacity Target User SVD
Figure 4.39: Capacity Preprocessing Figure 4.40: Capacity Target User SVD
4.3.4 Capacity With SNRpre = 30dB
• Deteriorating the SNIR
It is not surprising to see the capacity of the eavesdroppers being reduced by the
French power allocation in Figure 4.37 and in Figure ??, since the SNIR have been
deteriorated.
• Power allocation results
Still, in all the cases, the waterfilling power allocation and the uniform power alloca-
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tion provide the same results, as explained in the previous part.
• Capacity of the target user
Comparing to the capacity of the target user in Uniform and Waterfilling power al-
location, the capacity obtained using the French power allocation is at a quite poor
value at SNRpre = 30dB 4.40. This comes from the SNR of the target user which
have been reduced by the French power allocation. We also can observe the same
tendency regarding the slopes of the curves on the figures related to the capacity of
the target user 4.40.
4.3.5 Conclusion of scenario2
As a conclusion of the second scenario, we gathered the observations made during the
analysis of the results:
1. Losses in eavesdropper SNIR and capacity
It is interesting to see that the French power allocation is able to reduce the eaves-
dropper SNIR at very low values and especially in the preprocessing case. It is a bit
harder for the French power allocation to reduce the eavesdropper SNIR in case of
MRC processing.
2. Losses in target user capacity At SNRpre = 6dB, having small capacities, a loss of
1dB is quite important. On the contrary, a loss of 1dB, over 17dB is not so big, and es-
pecially if this loss of 1dB capacity is useful to reduce the SNIR of the eavesdroppers
and to keep the confidentiality.
3. More receiver antennas case If we increase the number of antennas for all the system,
that is to say (for the Transmitter, Target user and eavesdroppers), this new power
allocation will be less efficient to reduce the SNIR.
In case of high noise level (small SNRpre), it is not very useful to try to optimize the
SVD technique. It will be more a loss of capacity than a gain in confidentiality. Neverthe-
less at low noise level (high SNRpre), the French power allocation can be a a not too bad
tradeoff between capacity and confidentiality. However, from a general point of view, the
losses in target user capacity are more important than the losses in eavesdropper capaci-
ties.
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4.4 Conclusion of the whole simulation
This simulation offered a span of different techniques that the eavesdropper would apply
to catch the signal. The first part showed that the SVD processing technique is the most
interesting for the eavesdroppers to get the best SNIR. This first part of the simulation
also underlined the huge losses in SNIR for the eavesdropper once it goes a bit far from
the target user position (even in SVD processing). This last observation, shows that SVD
technique is already quite robust to keep confidentiality. Wemay have more antennas, that
is to say a 4 × 4 systems or more, and SVD processing would be even stronger, because
eavesdroppers will have more interferences. These added interferences, would deteriorate
the SNIR of the eavesdroppers.
The second part has been lead to optimize the SVD processing by adding the French power
allocation scheme to reduce the SNIR of the eavesdroppers. It showed that this optimiza-
tion may be a quite good tradeoff, but only at high noise level, between capacity and the
confidentiality. However from a general point of view, the losses in target user capacity
are bigger than the losses in eavesdropperSNIR.
To conclude on this simulation, it is obvious to say that SVD technique is already quite
robust against eavesdroppers, and even more if we increase the number of antennas(4 ×
4,8 × 8). The optimization of the SVD technique using the French power allocation does
not give very interesting results when eavesdropper are using SVD processing, and even
when eavesdropper are using combining techniques(EGC,MRC) as processing. One in-
teresting combining technique which would have been interesting to test is the optimum
combining which can reduce the interferences and enhance the SNIR.
74
Chapter 5
Conclusion and future work
5.1 Conclusion
This project presents one aspect of the security, the confidentiality, in a transmission be-
tween an access point and a target user. The main problem in wireless communications is
the broadcast aspect of the transmission from the transmitter, when we want to provide a
certain confidentiality. We investigated this problem in order to see if we can optimize this
confidentiality on the physical layer, based on a SVD transmission between the transmit-
ter and the target user. In spite of the different processing (SVD or combining techniques
(EGC,MRC)) that the eavesdroppers may apply to get a good SNIR, our goal has been to
achieve a certain tradeoff between the capacity of the target user and reducing the SNIR of
the eavesdroppers.
1. First Chapter
First step has been to achieve the delimitation of the problem, and especially the
domain to work in (Space-space domain).
2. Second chapter
We focused on the technical review in order to gather and explain all the different
processing that we would like to use in our simulations at the eavesdroppers side. A
theoretical analysis is also provided to show what are the signals that the target user
and the eavesdroppers would get using SVD processing.
3. Third chapter
This step is dedicated to present the simulation model that we used. The different
scenarios have also been described in this chapter.
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4. Forth and last chapter
This last step starts with a theoretical analysis of the results that we are expecting (in
SNIR) in the different processing ( SVD, EGC, MRC). This part is mainly dedicated
to providing the results and the analysis of the simulation.
The simulation has been divided in two main parts. First part has been dedicated to
observe the behavior of the SNIR of the eavesdroppers using different processing. Then,
we used a new power allocation to reduce the SNIR of the eavesdroppers and we looked at
the capacity at the target user side, to see if a kind of tradeoff between them can be found.
5.1.1 Conclusion of the first part
• Best processing for the eavesdropper close to the target user
SVD processing is the best technique to get a SNIR at a very good value (almost the
same than SNR of the target user) with a huge stability if the eavesdroppers are very
close from the target user (λ/100, λ/10, λ).
• SVD processing already quite secured
It is important to notice that once the eavesdropper goes away from the target user, it
will get a poor SNIR. Then we can conclude that the SVD processing is already quite
secured.
• Global best processing for the eavesdropper MRC technique appears to be the best
processing for eavesdroppers which are not so close from the target user, and offers
more stability than the other processing.
• Increase the number of antennas for the eavesdropper
If we increase the number of antennas of the whole system. The eavesdropper would
have more interferences in the received signals, and then the SVD would be even
more robust concerning the confidentiality.
5.1.2 conclusion of the second part
• Optimizing the SVD processing
In case of low noise, we saw that using the new power allocation which reduce the
SNIR close to 0dB, doesn’t deteriorate so much the capacity of the target user. In that
case, the SVD is a bit optimized.
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• The other processing
Combining techniques(EGC,MRC) are easier for the access point to reduce the SNIR.
• More antennas for the whole system
The new power allocation would be less efficient to reduce all the SNIR if we increase
the number of antennas of the eavesdropper, since it will be harder to reduce all the
SNIR at the same time.
To conclude on this project, we showed that the SVD processing is already quite robust
by itself. However in case of low noise and few number of antennas, an optimization using
a intelligent power allocation to reduce the SNIR may be interesting to develop.
5.2 Future work
Even if the SVD has been shown to be already secured by itself in this project, it may be
interesting to add a special cases to the scenarios we defined:
1. More antennas for the eavesdroppers only
Special case where the eavesdropper has more antennas than the target user and the
access point.
2. Different motions and positions of the eavesdropper
It may be interesting to see the results of the defined scenarios with different motions
for the eavesdroppers and different positions of the eavesdroppers from the target
user (for instance, in front of the target user).
3. Multi users case
Our scenarios have been achieved using only one target user. Adding other target
users would increase the interferences for the eavesdroppers.
4. Other wireless techniques
It can be interesting to lead the defined scenarios using other wireless techniques,
such as OFDM, or space-time coding.
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Appendix A
Post-Processing: Received signal for
the target user
From this question 2.10 we can choose to work before the processingUH of the target user
?? in order to get the receive signal just after the received antennas.


















 U11 · λ1 U12 · λ2








r1 = λ1 ·U11 · x1 + λ2 ·U12 · x2 + n1 (A.3)
r2 = λ1 ·U21 · x1 + λ2 ·U22 · x2 + n2 (A.4)
A.0.1 SNIR pre-processing for target user
Finally we get these two equations A.3 A.4. From here we can determine SNIR of the
target user with the formula 2.22
SNIR1 =
P1 · (λ1 ·U11)2
P2 · (λ2 ·U12)2 + Pn (A.5)
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SNIR2 =
P2 · (λ2 ·U22)2
P1 · (λ1 ·U21)2 + Pn (A.6)
P1 and P2 are respectively the power transmitted along the 1st and the2nd data stream.
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Appendix B
Pre-Processing: Received signal for
the eavesdropper











 V ∗e11 V ∗e21
















 λe1 · Ue11 λe2 · Ue12
λe1 · Ue21 λe2 · Ue22
·
 V ∗e11 V ∗e21












We multiply the two first matrix, and we obtain:
 λe1 · Ue11 λe2 · Ue12
λe1 · Ue21 λe2 · Ue22
 ·
 V ∗e11 V ∗e21
V ∗e12 V ∗e22

=
 λe1 · Ue11 · V ∗e11 + λe2 · Ue12 · V ∗e12 λe1 · Ue11 · V ∗e21 + λe2 · Ue12 · V ∗e22
λe1 · Ue21 · V ∗e11 + λe2 · Ue22 · V ∗e12 λe1 · Ue21 · V ∗e21 + λe2 · Ue22 · V ∗e22
 (B.4)
Now we take the result of B.4 and we multiply by V.
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 λe1 · Ue11 · V ∗e11 + λe2 · Ue12 · V ∗e12 λe1 · Ue11 · V ∗e21 + λe2 · Ue12 · V ∗e22










A = λe1 ·Ue11 ·V ∗e11 ·V11+λe1 ·Ue11 ·V ∗e21 ·V21+λe2 ·Ue12 ·V ∗e12 ·V11+λe2 ·Ue12 ·V ∗e22 ·V21 (B.6)
B = λe1 ·Ue11 ·V ∗e11 ·V12+λe1 ·Ue11 ·V ∗e21 ·V22+λe2 ·Ue12 ·V ∗e12 ·V12+λe2 ·Ue12 ·V ∗e22 ·V22 (B.7)
C = λe1 ·Ue21 ·V ∗e11 ·V11+λe1 ·Ue21 ·V ∗e21 ·V21+λe2 ·Ue22 ·V ∗e12 ·V11+λe2 ·Ue22 ·V ∗e22 ·V21 (B.8)
D = λe1 ·Ue21 ·V ∗e11 ·V12+λe1 ·Ue21 ·V ∗e21 ·V22+λe2 ·Ue22 ·V ∗e12 ·V12+λe2 ·Ue22 ·V ∗e22 ·V22 (B.9)
Finally we get:
r1 = A · x1 +B · x2 + n1 (B.10)
r2 = C · x1 +D · x2 + n2 (B.11)
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Appendix C
Testing the envelope distribution:
Rayleigh distribution
As can be seen on these plots ( representing the different links (h11, h12, h21, h22) ) in a 2x2
case, the envelope distribution is a Rayleigh distribution. We can prove it graphically by
the Rayleigh rule of thumb (at 1% signal level, the power is -20dB).
Figure C.1: Rayleigh criterium h11
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Figure C.2: Rayleigh criterium h12
Figure C.3: Rayleigh criterium h21




D.1 System model: The 802.11n Channel Model
The first channel model that has been investigated is the 802.11n channel model, also called
WWiSE (World-Wide Spectrum Efficiency) or TGn Sync. This model is very related to this
project, due to the fact that this standard is also specialized inMIMO system. This standard
is a very recent one, and the Publication is currently expected in September 2008.
We started to go through the 802.11n channel model simulated in matlab "MATLABo˝
implementation of the Indoor MIMOWLAN channel model proposed by the IEEE 802.11
TGn Channel Model Special Committe". We went through the documents related to the
matlab simulation, explaining the different environments, the functions, and how to use
it. We are going to describe briefly the 802.11n Channel model in Matlab, and what we
learned from this model. We will finish by a subsection explaining why we didn’t use this
model.
In this Matlab program, we used the program called "example-MIMO.m". This pro-
gram is using all the functions contained by the 802.11n Matlab program.
D.1.1 802.11n Matlab description
In this Matlab program, we used the program called "example-MIMO.m". This program is
using all the functions contained by the 802.11n Matlab program.
D.1.2 Parameters and results of the program
Below is a summary of the parameters useful in our project that we wanted to modify:
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Parameters
• Different environments(A to F) to simulate (they are described later in the report).
• MIMO systemswith different number of transmitter antennas and receiver antennas.
• Distance between the transmitter and the target user.
Below is a summary of the parameters useful in our project that we may modify:
Parameters
• Spacing between the antenna elements for the transmitter and the receiver.
• Simulation Length In Coherence Times (Length of simulation in Coherence Times)
• SamplingRate Hz (Sampling rate of the simulation, in Hz)
These are the Results that we can obtain, running theMatlab program "example-MIMO.m":
Results
• The channel matrix of the simulation
• The spatial correlation coefficients
• the Power delay profile
• CDF’s of the taps
• Doppler spectra of the taps
D.1.3 The different environments
Here is a summary of the MIMO WLAN channel model environments provided by the
matlab program. In this description model, K refers to the "Ricean Factor". The K factor
is the relation between the power of the LOS component and the power of the Rayleigh
component.
1. K = 0
When the K factor is equal to zero, it means that there are only NLOS components,
and the envelop r = |h| is following a rayleigh distribution.
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2. K > 0
Then whenK > 0, it means that in addition to the many NLOS paths, there is a LOS
path, and the envelop r = |h| is following a ricean distribution.
• Model A(Flat fading model "optional")
Environment : Narrowband




Delay Spread : 15ns
Scattering situation: LOS(K=0)/NLOS
• Model C
Environment : Residential/Small Office




Delay Spread : 50ns
Scattering situation: LOS(K=3)/NLOS
• Model E
Environment : Large Open Space/Office
Delay Spread : 100ns
Scattering situation: LOS(K=6)/NLOS
• Model F
Environment : Large Open Space
Delay Spread : 150ns
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Scattering situation: LOS(K=6)/NLOS
D.2 Utilization of the program
D.2.1 Parameters that we used
Many variables have been modified to simulate our results. This is a summary of the value
that we have set.
• We used a "Downlink" connection
• Environment A which is narrowband
• MIMO system : 2by2 / 4by4
• Spacing between antenna elements
• Distance between the Tx and target user (meters)
• Distance between the Tx and Eavesdropper (meters)
D.2.2 Assumptions
1. The receiver knows the channel
2. Antennas are omnidirectional antennas
D.2.3 Interests of the program
We used this program in order to obtain:
• The channel matrix H
This Channel matrix will be used to calculate the received signals of the users using
SVD method.
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